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PRETRIAL PUBLICITY,
PRESUMED PREJUDICE, AND
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With a view toward the characteristics that make Alaska unique
for change of venue analysis, this Article reviews how the criminal
justice system in general, and Alaska in particular, has addressed
the impact of prejudicial pretrial publicity on the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial by an impartial jury. It provides an
overview of the development of the concept of “presumed prejudice,” as opposed to “actual prejudice” demonstrated in jury voir
dire, and then explores why voir dire is never an appropriate tool
for presumed prejudice review. This overview is followed by a
critical look at the application of the principle of presumed prejudice in change of venue litigation in Alaska state courts.
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Next, the Article examines two Alaska federal criminal cases in
which a public opinion survey supported a motion for change of
venue. The Article argues that a valid public opinion survey is an
invaluable measure of the real impact of prejudicial pretrial publicity on a potential jury pool and should be utilized in highprofile cases when juror prejudice is likely. However, recognizing
that this tool may not always be a viable option, the Article suggests an alternative method for exposing possible juror prejudice,
and concludes that, at a minimum, trial courts, especially those in
Alaska, should carefully and independently weigh the concept of
presumed prejudice when considering the proper venue for sensationalized criminal cases.

I. INTRODUCTION
In October 19, 1990, Raymond Cheely was driving on the
Glenn Highway in Anchorage, Alaska with two friends, Doug
Gustafson and George Kerr. Gustafson was holding an HK-91
1
semi-automatic assault rifle in the front seat. After an incident
with another car on the highway, Gustafson fired a shot at the
2
other vehicle, killing a passenger. This incident marked Anchorage’s first “drive-by” shooting and sparked a great deal of public3
ity.
Cheely filed a motion for a change of venue outside of An4
chorage. In support of his motion, he submitted more than
twenty-four newspaper articles that addressed the shooting, the arrests of the defendants, and the trial and conviction of co5
defendant Gustafson. The coverage described Cheely as a lead
6
7
troublemaker and group leader, and both men were labeled “gun
8
nuts.” Several articles stated that Cheely maneuvered the car so
that Gustafson could get a clear shot, that police suspected Cheely
hid the murder weapon, and that both men had threatened others
9
not to testify against them. The articles also discussed a burglary
10
and theft that the two men were suspected of committing. De-

1. Cheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
2. Id. at 1169–70.
3. Id. at 1170–73.
4. Id. at 1170.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1171.
7. Id. at 1179.
8. Id. at 1171.
9. Id. at 1171–73.
10. Id. These newspaper articles were in addition to an earlier wave of publicity about Gustafson’s trial, held two weeks prior to Cheely’s trial. The testimony
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spite this intense media coverage, the court ruled that a change of
venue was not required.11 Cheely was convicted of second-degree
12
murder and sentenced to sixty years imprisonment.
The struggle to protect criminal defendants charged with sensational crimes from exposure to “the media circus” can be traced
in American jurisprudence back to the trial of Aaron Burr in
13
1807. The former Vice President had been charged with treason
for planning the seizure of New Orleans and the invasion of Mex14
ico in defiance of President Jefferson. The charge of treason
against Colonel Burr was the focus of the media and saturated Virginia newspapers, which informed the jurors in great detail of
15
events and proceedings leading up to the trial. The Virginia press
described a purported grand plan of insurrection, where Burr
would invade Mexico, detach the southwest from the United
States, and form an empire stretching from the Mississippi Valley
16
to Mexico City.
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, who presided
over Burr’s trial, had to confront the effect of pretrial publicity on
17
the prospective jurors. The concern was and is that pretrial publicity will impair the Sixth Amendment guarantee that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
18
wherein the crime shall have been committed.” In his opinion,
Chief Justice Marshall recognized the importance of an impartial
jury:
The great value of the trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness and impartiality. Those who most prize the institution,
prize it because it furnishes a tribunal which may be expected to
be uninfluenced by an undue bias of the mind . . . . Why do personal prejudices constitute a just cause of challenge? Solely because the individual who is under their influence is presumed to
have a bias on his mind which will prevent an impartial decision

at Gustafson’s trial and the testimony reported by the media echoed most of the
prejudicial reports about Cheely. Id.
11. Id. at 1175–76.
12. Id. at 1169.
13. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1807) (No. 14,692g) [hereinafter Burr I].
14. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 201, 202–06 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1807) (No.
14,694a) [hereinafter Burr II].
15. Id. at 203–04.
16. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL
OF DEMOCRACY 38 (1994).
17. Id. at 43–44.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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of the case, according to the testimony. He may declare that
notwithstanding these prejudices he is determined to listen to
the evidence, and be governed by it; but the law will not trust
him. Is there less reason to suspect him who has prejudged the
case, and has deliberately formed and delivered an opinion upon
it? Such a person may believe that he will be regulated by testimony,
but the law suspects him, and certainly not without rea19
son.

While Chief Justice Marshall was clearly concerned about protecting the defendant’s express rights under the United States Constitution, he also recognized that both procedural and substantive
justice can be compromised by an underlying, immutable fact of
human nature: the opinions of others can inform and direct the decisions of jurors, often in subtle ways impossible to detect in a pub20
lic courtroom. Acknowledgment of this fact is an inherent com21
ponent of the court’s duty to ensure overall justice. Otherwise,
regardless of how fair the actual procedure and the subsequent results appear, the integrity of a jury verdict, and thus the judicial system, will always be questioned in an environment polluted by sus22
picions of bias. Consequently, Chief Justice Marshall also realized
that the trial court has a duty to independently assess, and possibly
23
presume, partiality, even in spite of a juror’s denial of bias. The
Chief Justice began a rigorous voir dire of prospective jurors on
24
August 3, 1807. Forty-eight prospective jurors were examined the
first day, and forty-four were excused after admitting to being in25
fluenced by the newspapers. After two weeks of voir dire, the
panel of prospective jurors was exhausted, and a second venire was
26
summoned.
Chief Justice Marshall did not disqualify jurors for having information and opinions on the case, so long as the prepossession
was a “light impression” that “may leave the mind open to a fair
27
consideration.” This rule was applied both to views on the full
28
case and views on an essential element of the charge. Furthermore, regardless of what a juror claimed, it was up to the court to

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Burr I, 25 F. Cas. at 50.
Id. at 50–51.
See id.
See id.
See id.
ABRAMSON, supra note 16, at 40.
Id.
Id. at 40–42.
Burr I, 25 F. Cas. at 51.
Id.
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determine the degree of the juror’s foregone conclusion of the defendant’s guilt.29
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Marshall’s efforts to confront the
bias of jurors did not distinguish between presumed and actual
30
prejudice. The only tool available to him to ferret out the impar31
tiality of jurors was his own tenacious voir dire. However, the
sole use of voir dire is antithetical to the presumption-of-prejudice
analysis. If pretrial publicity has so permeated a community such
that prospective jurors cannot accurately assess the depth to which
32
editorial journalism has infiltrated their minds, voir dire of a jury
panel from that community can be a futile exercise. Therefore,
unless prejudice is presumed, the judge will be making a decision
based upon information from untrustworthy sources and, as a re33
sult, the integrity of the process will be compromised.
Nevertheless, in 1878, the Supreme Court entirely removed
the concept of presumed prejudice from the inquiry into juror im34
partiality. In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court established that a finding of juror bias must be based on actual evidence
35
that a juror had clearly formed a biased opinion.
Eighty-eight years later, facing the “pervasiveness of modern
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity
from the minds of the jurors,” the Supreme Court in Sheppard v.
36
Maxwell accepted and clarified the notion of presumed preju37
dice. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Doctor Sam
38
Sheppard on the principle of presumed prejudice from publicity.
After a thorough review of the pretrial publicity and media coverage of the trial, the Supreme Court found that “the state trial judge
did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently

29. Id. at 50.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Editorial journalism is also called “emotional reporting,” and is juxtaposed
to “factual reporting.” Judge Peter D. O’Connell, Pretrial Publicity, Change of
Venue, Public Opinion Polls: A Theory of Procedural Justice, 65 U. DET. L. REV.
169, 186–87 (1988); Vineet R. Shahani, Change the Motion, Not the Venue: A Critical Look at the Change of Venue Motion, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 102 (2005).
33. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 186–87; Shahani, supra note 32, at 102.
34. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
35. Id. at 155–57. The court further held that findings of a trial court regarding juror bias would not be set aside by a reviewing court unless there was manifest error. Id. at 156.
36. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
37. Id. at 362.
38. Id.
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prejudicial publicity which saturated the community.”39 The prejudice to the defendant was presumed even though all of the jurors
asserted that they would not be influenced by outside sources of in40
formation during voir dire. Despite the Court’s use of the concept
of presumed prejudice in Sheppard, confusion still surrounds presumed and actual prejudice, even within the Supreme Court.
The premise of this Article is that Alaska courts have not been
immune to the common mistakes made when dealing with potential juror prejudice. Alaskan communities are especially suscepti41
ble to pretrial publicity given the relatively small state population
and the magnified impact of media outlets in the state. The Alaska
Supreme Court has endorsed the idea of presumed prejudice by
adopting the American Bar Association’s proposed standards that
call for a change of venue whenever there is a “substantial likelihood” that a fair trial by an impartial jury cannot be had, without
42
requiring a showing of actual prejudice. However, the guarantee
of impartiality has been compromised in recent years in several
43
high-profile state cases. Even while the pervasiveness of modern
communications has increased in Alaska, and criminal caseloads
44
have dramatically expanded, venue changes have been infrequent.
Alaska state trial and appellate courts have blurred the distinction
45
Like trial courts
between presumed and actual prejudice.
throughout the nation, Alaska’s trial courts rely almost entirely on
voir dire to ascertain the impact of pretrial publicity on jurors. Due
to erroneous assumptions about the effects of pretrial publicity on
the public, trial courts also rely upon other equally inadequate
tools to mitigate against the use of prejudiced jurors.
This Article argues that, though historically the most popular
approach, voir dire is neither an appropriate nor effective initial
step in what must be a two-step inquiry into juror prejudice. First,
prior to the jury selection process, trial courts need to examine
carefully the possibility of presumed prejudice when the issue is
raised. Second, if necessary, actual prejudice should be separately

39. Id. at 363.
40. Id. at 354 n.9.
41. The U.S. Census Bureau 2004 population estimate for Alaska was 655,435.
U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html.
42. See Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 748 (Alaska 1980) (citing ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 8-3.3(c) (2d ed. Tentative Draft 1978)).
43. See discussion infra pt. II.
44. See id.
45. See id.
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explored during voir dire. This separate analysis for presumed and
actual prejudice is especially critical in a state like Alaska.
In addition to voir dire, the Federal Defender Office for the
District of Alaska has utilized another instrument to measure the
46
impact of pretrial publicity in two high-profile federal cases. That
tool is a public opinion survey of the prospective jury pool conducted by a market research corporation using scientific marketing
47
and survey techniques. In United States v. Cheely (Cheely II), that
research persuaded the United States District Court for Alaska to
grant a motion for a change of venue in a mail-bombing murder
48
49
trial. In United States v. Maad, the district court declined to
grant a change of venue based on prejudicial pretrial publicity that
was supported by a public opinion survey. However, the Ninth
50
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s holding. In
these two cases, public opinion surveys demonstrated bias in the
communities from which jurors were drawn, even two years after
51
the crime in Cheely, and despite the failure to show actual preju52
dice during jury selection in Maad.
Part II of this Article reviews the evolution of presumed prejudice from pretrial publicity doctrine, culminating in the Sheppard v.
53
Maxwell decision. Part III explains the ineffectiveness of traditional methods of maintaining a just judicial system when it comes
to defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights and focuses on the misapplication of the voir dire process to presumed-prejudice review.
Part IV applies these principles to the evaluation of prejudice
analysis by Alaska state courts. Part V describes the experience of
the Alaska Federal Defender Office in utilizing a public opinion
survey to support change of venue motions in the Cheely and Maad
cases. The section hypothesizes why public opinion surveys would
more accurately reflect community sentiment about a high-profile
case, and, consequently, be more effective than voir dire in exposing juror bias. Part V also presents a viable alternative to a full-

46. Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay, Psychologists as Consultants for
Changes of Venue: The Use of Public Opinion Surveys, 7 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV.
309, 310–13 (1983).
47. 814 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Alaska 1992). Cheely II involved a criminal prosecution for a mail-bombing allegedly orchestrated by Cheely while in prison for the
drive-by shooting. See discussion infra pt. V(A).
48. Id. at 1433.
49. 75 Fed. App’x 599 (9th Cir. 2003).
50. Id. at 601.
51. 814 F. Supp. at 1433.
52. Maad, 75 Fed. App’x at 601.
53. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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scale public opinion survey, which utilizes a scientifically-designed
jury questionnaire.
In conclusion, the authors suggest that principles of justice are
threatened by the failure to differentiate between presumed and
actual prejudice. They further argue that in an era of rapidly advancing methods of communication, Alaska trial courts must, at a
minimum, give due consideration to the need for an independent
analysis of presumed prejudice when deciding on the proper venue
for high-profile criminal cases. Voir dire should never be the basis
of a presumed-prejudice inquiry.
Lastly, when prejudice can be fairly presumed, trial courts
should not hesitate to change venue. The large geographic expanse
of Alaska offers many alternative sites where pretrial publicity
would not be an issue. Trials moved between Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau can avoid the influence of local media coverage.
In rural communities, the courts have the option of other venues
within the judicial district or larger cities outside the district.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PRESUMED
PREJUDICE IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
A. Act One: The Curtain Opens on the Media Circus
The legal principle of the “impartial juror” has been severely
tested by the twentieth-century media age. The specter of what has
come to be known as the first “circus trial” leapt into the public
54
spotlight in 1935. The trial of Bruno Hauptmann for kidnapping
55
the Lindbergh baby generated such unprecedented media exposure that the American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted Canon
35 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prohibiting the photography of,
56
and broadcast from, court proceedings, out of fear of “the degrad[ation] [of] the court and . . . misconceptions with respect
57
thereto in the mind of the public.” The Federal Rules of Criminal
58
Procedure codified this cannon shortly thereafter, as well as the
provision for a change of venue upon motion by the defendant if
“so great a prejudice against the defendant exists . . . that the de59
fendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.” In 1941, Su-

54. New Jersey v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935).
55. Id. at 813.
56. Id.
57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1937).
58. This type of media coverage is prohibited except as otherwise provided by
statute. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a).
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preme Court Justice Hugo Black summed up the issue in a statement often repeated in the jurisprudence of pretrial publicity: “Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the
60
meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.”
In spite of Justice Black’s admonition, “trial by media” continued to plague the criminal justice system as information technology advanced into the second half of the twentieth century. The
61
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Stroble v. California.
There, the Court reviewed the conviction of Fred Stroble for the
62
murder of a six-year-old girl in Los Angeles County in 1949. Under attention-grabbing headlines, the media coverage of Stroble’s
63
arrest described his confession.
Stroble was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
64
death. The Supreme Court of California unanimously affirmed
65
the conviction and death sentence. Although the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that the district attorney’s release of
Stroble’s confession to the press for widespread distribution was
prejudicial, the majority found that the petitioner had “failed to
show that the newspaper accounts aroused against him such preju66
dice in the community as to necessarily prevent a fair trial.” In
dissent, Justice Frankfurter stated emphatically that
[p]recisely because the feeling of the outside world cannot, with
the utmost care, be kept wholly outside the courtroom[,] every
endeavor must be taken in a civilized trial to keep it outside. To
have the prosecutor himself feed the press with evidence that no
self-restrained press ought to publish in anticipation of a trial is
to make the State itself through the prosecutor, who wields its
power, a conscious participant in trial by newspaper, instead of
by those methods which centuries of experience have
shown to
67
be indispensable to the fair administration of justice.

By 1959, the Supreme Court decided to take action against
68
“trial by media” in Marshall v. United States. Howard Marshall
was convicted of unlicensed dispensing of drugs in the United

60. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
61. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
62. Id. at 183–84.
63. The confession was released to the press by the district attorney and the
headlines proclaimed that the defendant was, among other things, a “werewolf,”
“fiend,” and “sex-mad killer.” Id. at 192.
64. Id. at 183.
65. Id. at 184.
66. Id. at 193.
67. Id. at 201 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
68. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
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States District Court for the District of Colorado.69 The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction when, due to newspaper coverage,
seven members of the jury learned of the defendant’s criminal history of practicing medicine without a license despite the trial
70
court’s ruling that this evidence was inadmissible. The Supreme
Court held that “[t]he prejudice to the defendant is almost certain
to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through news
71
accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution’s evidence.”
In 1961, the Supreme Court vacated a defendant’s conviction
72
in Irvin v. Dowd, where the impact of prejudicial publicity was
73
demonstrated in the voir dire of the jury. The trial had become
the cause célèbre of the small community with the local media covering the defendant’s extensive criminal history and discussing his
74
guilt and punishment. The jury panel admitted to exposure to the
detailed pretrial publicity and to opinions that reflected the public75
But under questioning by the trial judge, the final panel
ity.
76
stated they could still maintain impartiality. Thus, the Indiana
77
courts found that Irvin did not establish “manifest” prejudice.
The Supreme Court, however, found that a review of the voir
dire of prospective jurors demonstrated prejudice where ninety
78
percent of questioned jurors expressed a presumption of guilt.
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, summarized the state
of “trial by media” at that time:
Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had in States throughout the country, in which
substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted
because of inflammatory newspaper accounts—too often, as in
this case, with the prosecutor’s collaboration—exerting pressures
upon potential jurors before trial and even during the course of
trial, thereby making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
secure a jury capable of taking
in, free of prepossessions, evi79
dence submitted in open court.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 310.
Id. at 311–12.
Id. at 312–13.
366 U.S. 717 (1961).
Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 725.
See id. at 725–29.
See id.
See id. at 724–25.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 730 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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B. Act Two: Enter Presumed Prejudice
By 1963, the Supreme Court was ready to make the move to
the concept of presumed prejudice. Before trial in Rideau v. Louisiana,80 the local media televised an “interview” of the defendant,
where he admitted with specificity to the commission of a robbery,
81
kidnapping, and murder. The trial court refused to excuse three
potential jurors for cause, even though they admitted to seeing
82
Rideau’s televised confession. The jury convicted Rideau, and he
83
was sentenced to death.
The Supreme Court had little difficulty presuming that Rideau
had been denied a fair trial, finding the trial to be a “hollow for84
mality.” The Supreme Court reversed Rideau’s conviction and re85
quired a new trial in a different venue.
The doctrine of presumed prejudice was most clearly illus86
trated in 1966 in Sheppard v. Maxwell. Dr. Sam Sheppard was
87
charged with the murder of his wife. The case was the ultimate
88
spectacle. Newspapers published many details and rumors never
89
presented in court. A coroner’s inquest was conducted in a school
90
gymnasium to accommodate the press. Trial jurors, who were not
91
sequestered, were constantly exposed to this media coverage.

80. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
81. Id. at 724–25.
82. Id. Rideau had exhausted his peremptory challenges.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 726.
85. Id. Rideau was twice tried in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and each time convicted and sentenced to death. Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472, 476 (5th Cir.
2000). After more than ten years on Louisiana’s death row, his death sentence
was vacated under the holding of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Id. His
conviction was vacated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000, and Rideau
was released from the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola after forty years. Id.
at 489.
Rideau went on to become one of the best known prisoners in America and
an award-winning journalist. See Wilbert Rideau, http://www.wilbertrideau.com
(last visited Sept. 26, 2005). In 1992, he was recognized by Life Magazine as “The
Most Rehabilitated Prisoner in America.” Id.
86. 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see discussion supra pt. I.
87. 384 U.S. at 335.
88. Id. at 337–49. The description of the media coverage from investigation
through trial occupies thirteen pages of the Sheppard opinion. Id.
89. Id. at 356–57.
90. See id. at 339.
91. Id. at 345, 353.
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Yet, the trial court did not grant the defendant’s requests for a
change of venue.92
Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court accurately predicted that both the trial and appellate courts would be facing increasingly more difficult challenges in protecting criminal defendants from pretrial publicity:
Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that
the balance is never weighed against the accused. And appellate
tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of
93
the circumstances.

C. Act Three: Confusion Returns
During the final decades of the twentieth century, modern
communications had expanded exponentially. Simultaneously, the
courts struggled to maintain the balance between the competing
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to a
94
fair trial. In 1975, the Supreme Court modified the concept of
95
presumed prejudice in the case of Murphy v. Florida.
Jack Murphy was arrested in 1968 in Dade County, Florida
96
and charged with burglary and robbery of a Miami Beach home.
Murphy had previously been convicted of the 1964 theft of the Star
of India sapphire and was referred to in the media as “Murph the
97
Surf.” After being convicted of a murder in Broward County,
Florida and pleading guilty to federal charges involving stolen securities, Murphy was convicted of robbery by a jury in Dade
98
County in 1970.
Murphy argued in the Supreme Court that prejudice should
have been presumed in his case since all of the jurors were aware of
either the Star of India theft or the Broward County murder con99
viction. The Court, however, distinguished this case from the
100
“conceded circumstances” of the earlier Supreme Court cases:
The proceedings in these [other] cases were entirely lacking in
the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 352.
Id. at 362.
See Nietzel & Dillehay, supra note 46, at 310.
421 U.S. 794 (1975).
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 796, 798.
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 725 (1963).
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system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the
verdict of a mob. They cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a state defendant’s
prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he
is charged
alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due
101
process.

The court then announced a new, albeit vague, standard for assessing presumed prejudice: “To resolve this case, we must turn, therefore, to any indications in the totality of circumstances that peti102
After reviewing the
tioner’s trial was not fundamentally fair.”
voir dire of the jurors, the Supreme Court was convinced that, in
the totality of the circumstances, Murphy’s trial was fundamentally
103
fair.
104
Jon
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Patton v. Yount.
Yount had been convicted of murder and rape in a Pennsylvania
105
state court in 1966 and sentenced to life imprisonment. His con106
viction was reversed, and he was retried in 1970. He was again
107
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life. Yount re108
quested a change of venue multiple times before the second trial.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to consider, in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media publicity that now
109
arises so frequently in the trial of sensational criminal cases.”
The Court found that the record in Yount’s case did not “reveal
the kind of ‘wave of public passion’ that would have made a fair
110
trial unlikely by the jury that was empaneled as a whole.” The
court also noted that, while Irvin held “that adverse publicity can
create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the ju111
rors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed,” it
also raised the standard of review for overturning the trial court’s
112
finding of impartiality, to the level of “manifest error.”
Murphy and Yount reinforce the concept that trial by an impartial, unbiased jury is a fundamental pillar of due process. Nevertheless, the conclusion of those two decisions sounded a retreat
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
Id.
See id. at 803.
467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1031.
Id.
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by the Supreme Court from the standards of “presumed prejudice”
established in Rideau and its progeny. The balance between freedom of the press and the impartial jury shifted dramatically toward
acceptance of sensational media coverage, raising the bar of establishing presumed prejudice for criminal defendants.
III. THE WOEFUL INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRADITIONAL METHODS
OF MITIGATING AGAINST JUROR PREJUDICE
In 1952, in Stroble v. California, Justice Frankfurter bemoaned
that
[s]cience with all its advances has not given us instruments for
determining when the impact of such newspaper exploitation has
spent itself or whether the powerful impression bound to be
made by such inflaming articles as here preceded the trial can be
dissipated in the mind of the average
juror by the tame and often
113
pedestrian proceedings in court.

Thankfully, this is no longer true. There is a plethora of noteworthy empirical studies that demonstrate the impact of pretrial pub114
licity on juror decision-making.
This is important because the voir dire process has repeatedly
been recognized as a woefully ineffective device for determining
115
whether prejudice should be presumed. There are a number of
possible explanations for why voir dire is not conducive to juror
candor.
First, people are intimidated by the judicial system and the
courtroom environment. The pressure of voir dire examination has
116
actually caused some jurors to forget their own name.
Second, people generally do not like to admit that they have
been influenced by the media, gossip, or rumor.

113. 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also discussion
supra pt. II.A.
114. See generally O’Connell, supra note 32 (providing an overview of the latest
studies done using both field and experimental methods); Shahani, supra note 32;
Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the
Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 428 (1997).
115. See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study,
38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1965); O’Connell, supra note 32, at 173–74, 178; Shahani,
supra note 32, at 104–05; Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 440–43; David
L. Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science
Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 271 (1981); Hans Ziesel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The
Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal
District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 528–29 (1978).
116. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 183.
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Third, there is a social stigma against those who have prejudged someone, and publicly acknowledging one’s prejudice is difficult. Some jurors may be embarrassed or offended when asked
probing questions about their personal feelings on a matter and
117
will consequently repress their opinions.
Fourth, some jurors might be unaware that they have formed
118
an irrevocable bias. Furthermore, the point at which an impression is weak enough to be overcome, or too strong to be sup119
In the words of Judge Peter
pressed, is difficult to ascertain.
O’Connell, asking a juror whether he or she can render a fair and
impartial verdict is “a little like asking a practicing alcoholic if he
120
has his drinking under control . . . .” Moreover, once an undesirable thought is identified, keeping it out of one’s mind becomes a
121
formidable paradox. Thus, modified jury instructions and the deliberative process will have little positive impact on a prejudiced ju122
In fact, studies have shown that deliberation and judicial
ror.
123
admonitions actually further entrench bias in juries.
Fifth, some may doubt that an opinion is strong enough to
cloud judgment permanently on a case, and any claim otherwise
will be viewed as a veiled attempt to avoid jury duty or as a failure
to take one’s civic duty seriously. Last, some people will do any124
thing to be involved in a high-profile case.
In addition to the use of modified jury instructions and an emphasis on the deliberative process, other approaches have been
taken to combat the problems generated by high-profile cases, including the granting of continuances in the hopes that “the passage
of time will dampen the effects of the prejudicial attitudes preva125
However, not only do psychologists
lent in the community.”
doubt this, but it assumes that the publicity will cease and not begin
126
again once trial resumes.

117. See id.
118. Shahani, supra note 32, at 105; Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at
449.
119. Shahani, supra note 32, at 100.
120. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 183.
121. Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 447.
122. See id. at 440–41
123. Shahani, supra note 32, at 105.
124. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 179 (citing Suggs & Sales, supra note 115, at
246).
125. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 177.
126. Id. at 177–78; Shahani, supra note 32, at 104–05; Studebaker & Penrod,
supra note 114, at 439–40.
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The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice suggest that individual examinations of each prospective juror take place in private127
and recommend a lengthier voir dire with additional peremptory
128
However, this can
challenges when pretrial prejudice is likely.
make the process extremely time-consuming, and it presupposes
that additional poking and prodding of jurors by judges and attorneys will expose prejudice that would otherwise have gone undetected. So far, research in the area has found that neither judges’
nor attorneys’ causal or peremptory challenges are related to con129
viction rates and that “extended voir dire [is] no more effective at
eliminating the biasing effect of pretrial publicity than . . . minimal
130
voir dire.”
IV. PRESUMED PREJUDICE IN ALASKA
Alaska has always taken pride in having state constitutional
protections that often go beyond those of the national constitution
and in zealously protecting the right to a jury trial. The Alaska Supreme Court has consistently given the right to a jury trial under
the Alaska Constitution a more expansive interpretation than the
United States Supreme Court has under the Sixth Amendment of
131
Not surprisingly, the Alaska
the United States Constitution.
132
Constitution specifically guarantees the right to an impartial jury.
This right was supported by Alaska Statute 22.10.040, enacted at
the time of statehood in 1959, which authorized the superior court
to change the place of trial “when there is reason to believe that an
133
Yet, Alaska trial and appellate
impartial trial cannot be had.”
courts have been increasingly reluctant to presume prejudice.
A. The Application of Presumed Prejudice to High-Profile Cases
by the Alaska Supreme Court
134
In Alvarado v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of an impartial jury as related to the judicial system:

127. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 8-3.5(a) (3d ed. 1992).
128. Id. § 8-3.5(c).
129. Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 441.
130. Id. at 442.
131. See generally RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971); State v. Browder,
486 P.2d 925 (Alaska 1971); Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
132. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
133. ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.040(1) (2004).
134. 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971).
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The jury, like the right to vote, is fundamentally preservative of
ideals which are essential to our democratic system. When the
impartiality of jurors is neglected, the injury is not limited to the
defendant—there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal
reflected in the processes of our courts. For this reason, we must
be ever militant to protect the notion
of our juries as bodies truly
135
representative of the community.

Nearly a decade later, the Alaska Supreme Court decided two
cases that helped define the standards in Alaska for presumed
prejudice within the context of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In
136
Mallott v. State, the court recognized the inherent difficulty in establishing prejudice through the voir dire process:
[T]he voir dire process is not an infallible Geiger counter of juror prejudice, and to rely excessively on its efficacy in uncovering
“actual prejudice” places an unrealistic burden on a defendant.
Where there has been intensive pre-trial publicity, and a substantial number of venirepersons appear to have been prejudiced
by the publicity, the probability that similar prejudices are
shared by, but have
not been extracted from, impaneled jurors
137
cannot be ignored.

The court went on to adopt an ABA draft standard that encourages a change of venue without the requirement of a showing of actual prejudice where there is a “substantial likelihood” that a trial
138
by an impartial jury cannot be had.
139
Soon after the Mallott decision, in Oxereok v. State, the
Alaska Supreme Court applied the ABA proposal and reversed a
murder conviction based on a denial of a defendant’s motion for
140
change of venue. The court found that “[t]he record of the voir
dire examination of Oxereok’s jury panel [did] not reveal that any
141
of the impaneled jurors were in fact predisposed to convict him.”

135. Id. at 904 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see Browder, 486 P.2d
at 937 (“[T]he right to jury trial holds a central position in the framework of
American justice . . . . [T]he accused’s right to fair trial [must be accorded primacy] against considerations of convenience or expediency to the state.”).
136. 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980).
137. Id. at 748.
138. “A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted whenever
it is determined that, because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, there is a substantial likelihood that, in the absence of such relief, a fair trial
by an impartial jury cannot be had . . . . A showing of actual prejudice shall not be
required.” Id. (citing ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal
Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press § 8-3.3(c) (2d ed. Tentative Draft 1978)).
139. 611 P.2d 913 (Alaska 1980).
140. Id. at 919.
141. Id.
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However, the court, relying on Mallott, also concluded that because
of the inflammatory nature of pretrial publicity, a showing of actual
142
prejudice was not required.
The Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of presumed prejudice from pretrial publicity since 1980. The Alaska
Court of Appeals, however, has applied the Mallott decision to
numerous high-profile criminal cases over the past twenty-five
years. In only one case has the court of appeals reversed a conviction based on the failure of the trial court to grant a change of
143
venue.
B. The Application of Presumed Prejudice to High-Profile Cases
by the Alaska Court of Appeals
144

1. Newcomb v. State. In 1987, Gary Newcomb was charged
with shooting two Anchorage police officers who were attempting
145
to arrest him. Newcomb had escaped from the Wildwood Correctional Center in Kenai where he was imprisoned for robbery,
146
and had been on the lam for five months. During Newcomb’s attempted arrest, he grabbed one of the officer’s service revolvers
147
and shot both officers. He escaped again, only to be arrested by
148
Anchorage police later that night. Newcomb repeatedly moved
149
for a change of venue, relying on the “Mallott standard” of pre150
151
sumed prejudice, but the trial court denied each motion.
The court of appeals recognized that Newcomb’s crimes re152
At least thirty-three articles
ceived intensive pretrial publicity.
relating to the case appeared in Anchorage newspapers prior to
153
trial. Additional newspaper articles appeared during jury selection in Anchorage, and the trial garnered significant attention in

142. Id.
143. See Nickolai v. State, 708 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
144. 800 P.2d 935 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
145. Id. at 937.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. “The normal rule requiring a showing of actual prejudice must be relaxed,
however, when a case generates ‘intensive pretrial publicity’ that results in ‘a substantial number of venirepersons [who] appear to have been prejudiced . . . .’” Id.
at 938 (citing Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d, 737, 748 (Alaska 1980)).
151. Newcomb, 800 P.2d at 937.
152. Id. at 938.
153. Id.
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the broadcast media.154 Of the seventy-eight venirepersons questioned during voir dire, twenty-eight were excused for cause due to
exposure to pretrial publicity or familiarity with various aspects of
155
The court found that twenty-eight disqualified panel
the case.
members qualified as a “substantial number of venire persons” in
156
order to apply the “Mallott standard.”
The court went on to examine the factors that would be relevant in gauging the likelihood of “unrevealed jury prejudice” nec157
The first factor was the
essary to compel a change of venue.
158
The court stated that
“precise nature of the pretrial publicity.”
“[t]he potential for unrevealed jury prejudice can be expected to
increase when publicity is inherently prejudicial or inflamma159
tory.” The examples cited by the court included media reports of
confessions and “other significant evidence that is suppressed or
otherwise inadmissible”; details that will be disputed by the defendant at trial; and “emotionally charged editorials,” including ac160
counts of the defendant’s criminal history or character.
The second factor considered by the court was the timing of
161
pretrial publicity. The court felt that even when jury voir dire establishes that many prospective jurors have been exposed to
“highly inflammatory publicity,” such “exposure will be entitled to
less weight if it appears that the passage of time has blunted its im162
pact on the panel.”
The third factor was the nature of the community in which the
163
The Newcomb court’s greatest concern was
trial is conducted.
the possibility of unrevealed jury prejudice for crimes tried in small
164
communities.
Using these factors, the court of appeals concluded that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in denying a change of

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 939.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. See Oxereok v. State, 611 P.2d 913 (Alaska 1980) (tried in Nome,
Alaska); Jerrel v. State, 756 P.2d 301 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (tried in Homer,
Alaska); Nickolai v. State, 708 P.2d 1292 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (tried in
Dillingham, Alaska).
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venue.165 The court found that little of the pretrial publicity was
166
“particularly inflammatory or inherently prejudicial.” The bulk
of the pretrial publicity concerning Newcomb’s case occurred “well
167
Moreover, the court found it significant that the
before trial.”
trial was held in Anchorage, “a relatively large community in which
even extensive pretrial publicity can be expected to have limited
168
impact.”
Several aspects of this case and its tripartite test are noteworthy. First, the presumed prejudice analysis was based in large part
169
on the voir dire record. Second, the judge assumed that the passage of time eroded the harmful effects of pretrial publicity, which
170
does not appear to have been the case. Third, the court was especially reluctant to acknowledge the impact of pretrial publicity in
171
Despite being Alaska’s largest city, the population
Anchorage.
172
of the Anchorage Borough was only 225,170, which, relative to
jurisdictions in other states, is a small jurisdiction, and, therefore,
173
Overall, the
more likely to be affected by pretrial publicity.
court’s dubious premises, which are built into its multi-step test, resurface in all of the state cases that follow.
174

2. Cheely v. State. At Cheely’s trial for second-degree murder in Anchorage’s first “drive-by” shooting, twenty of the seventy
potential jurors were excused for cause because they had formed
175
opinions about the case based on media coverage. The appellate
court felt that Cheely’s motion for a change of venue should have
been analyzed under the “Mallott standard,” using the factors laid
165. Id. at 940.
166. Id. at 939.
167. Id. The trial was nine months after Newcomb’s escape from Wildwood
and four months after the shootout and his arrest in Anchorage.
168. Id. at 940.
169. See id. at 939–40.
170. See O’Connell, supra note 32, at 177–78; Shahani, supra note 32, at 104;
Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 114, at 439–40.
171. See Newcomb, 800 P.2d at 940.
172. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates and Population Distribution
Branches, Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population of States and Counties
1980–1989 (Mar. 1992), http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/e8089co.txt.
According to the most recent data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the projected
population of Anchorage in 2004 is 272,687. U.S. Census Bureau, Population
Estimates Program, 2004 Population Estimates, Anchorage Municipality, Alaska,
http://factfinder.census.gov.
173. Shahani, supra note 32, at 114.
174. 861 P.2d 1168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993); see discussion supra pt. I.
175. Id. at 1174.
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out in Newcomb.176 However, not only did the court fail to address
the “precise nature” and timing of the pretrial publicity, the analysis done by the court was primarily based on the record of jury se177
The trial court allowed the use of an extensive juror
lection.
178
questionnaire and individual voir dire. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court “could reasonably conclude that pre-trial
publicity had made jury selection more difficult but not impossible,
and that the jurors ultimately selected did not harbor unrevealed
179
Once more, the court emphasized
prejudices against Cheely.”
the trial’s venue: “One fact that emerged from this individual questioning was that, in a large community such as Anchorage, many
180
A public
residents do not follow media coverage of events.”
181
opinion survey would later call these assumptions into question.
3. Woodard v. State.182 In June 1992, Jon Woodard was
183
In support of his motion for a
charged with felony murder.
change of venue, Woodard cited twelve newspaper articles and
184
The trial
forty-five television news reports covering his case.
court refused to grant the motion before voir dire and denied the
185
request without prejudice.
The trial court did, however, allow a juror questionnaire and
186
The jury questionnaire indicated that
individualized voir dire.
ninety-five percent of the prospective jurors had been exposed to
187
some pretrial publicity. During jury selection of the fifty-six prospective jurors, twenty-four were excused for cause, and of those,
only three were excused due to their exposure to pretrial public188
ity. Of the thirty-two who were not excused for cause, “all but
one had heard something about the case and fifteen had heard or
189
All thirty-two
seen something about Woodard in the media.”

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 1174–75.
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1175–76.
Id. at 1175.
See discussion infra pt. V(A).
Nos. A- 5187, 3933, 1998 WL 849246 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1998).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id.
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prospective jurors “assured the court that they could hear the case
without bias.”190
The court of appeals, applying the “more liberal standard
adopted by Mallott,” concluded that the record of jury selection
191
supported the trial court’s refusal to grant a change of venue.
The appellate court found that pretrial publicity was not inherently
prejudicial or inflammatory, even though that publicity referenced
Woodard’s criminal history (his prior arrest on federal drug and
weapon charges), other possible robberies police believed
Woodard had committed, and reports of Woodard having an “ar192
senal” of weapons and paramilitary literature. According to the
court, the fact that most of the publicity occurred several months
193
before trial lessened its impact on prospective jurors. Moreover,
since the trial was held in Anchorage, it was “reasonable to believe
194
that the publicity in the case was of ‘limited impact.’”
4. Stavenjord v. State.195 The latest example is the murder
trial of Paul Stavenjord in Palmer, Alaska in 1998. Stavenjord was
arrested after a month-long manhunt and charged with a double
196
homicide. Over fifty television and more than a dozen published
newspaper stories reported the manhunt during the summer of
197
Pretrial hearings in October of that year were similarly
1997.
198
covered by the media.
Media coverage disclosed information inadmissible at trial, including Stavenjord being expelled from school for using racial epithets, a juvenile arrest and two-year sentence for robbery, an escape from juvenile prison and high speed car chase, and a 1971
199
armed bank robbery motivated by drugs.
Jury selection (after prospective jurors completed written
questionnaires) lasted two weeks and included individual voir
200
dire. Of 184 prospective jurors, sixty were accepted for jury se201
lection. Forty-seven were excused for case-related reasons, and

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id. at *12–*14.
Id. at *13.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
66 P.3d 762 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 768–69.
Id. at 768.
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the balance were excused for reasons unrelated to the case.202 Of
the sixty initially accepted, another twenty-six were excused because of exposure to pretrial publicity, and eleven were excused
203
“because of exposure to publicity and other factors.” An additional juror was excused during trial after she recalled “reading or
204
hearing something about Stavenjord’s robbery conviction.”
The court of appeals examined the record of voir dire of the
205
twelve jurors and four alternates who heard the case. The court
concluded that those jurors knew only the bare details of the
crimes charged, and none of the information recalled was inflam206
matory or prejudicial. In addition, all of the jurors and alternates
207
Although
“expressed confidence that they could be impartial.”
the court recognized that there was substantial pretrial publicity, it
also considered that the trial was conducted eight months after the
manhunt and that “in an area as physically large as the MatanuskaSuusitna area, considering the size of its population, many people
208
were not influenced by the media coverage.”
The appellate court consistently relies on the trial judge’s
evaluation of “unrevealed prejudices” due to pretrial publicity, and
the Stavenjord case was no different. The court concluded that it
would “affirm the superior court’s denial of the motion for change
of venue unless [the court is] convinced, after [the court’s] own independent review of the record, that the superior court abused its
209
discretion.”
5. Summary. The Alaska Supreme Court has broadly ex210
panded the right to a jury trial under the Alaska Constitution. It
has adopted the ABA standard that recognizes “presumed prejudice” as a basis for a change of venue separate from proof of “ac211
tual” prejudice during the voir dire process. The courts in Mallott

202. Id.
203. Id. at 769.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. The population of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, of which Palmer is
part, was 53,920 in 1997. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program,
County Population Estimates and Demographic Components of Population
Change: Annual Time Series, July 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999 available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/co-99-08/99C8_02.txt.
209. Stavenjord, 66 P.3d at 770.
210. See infra, pt. IV.
211. Mallott v State, 608 P.2d 737, 748 (Alaska 1980).
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and Oxereok held that where intensive pretrial publicity has influenced a community, the probability that prejudices are “shared by,
but have not been extracted from, impaneled jurors, cannot be ig212
nored.” Nonetheless, the application of these principles to highprofile cases in Alaska has been marginal. The court of appeals has
blurred the line between presumed and actual prejudice. In applying the “Mallott standard,” the court has relied heavily on the record of jury selection and the discretion of the trial judge. Furthermore, unacceptable assumptions have been made when
applying the three-part Newcomb test, when used at all. The failure to critically analyze the nature and impact of prejudicial publicity on the community called upon to decide the guilt or innocence
of a criminal defendant prior to the jury selection process jeopardizes the concept of an impartial jury, impugns the integrity of a jury
verdict, and endangers justice in general. None of these results
should be tolerated in light of the availability of scientific public
opinion surveys that have been able to measure the impact of publicity on a community.
V. THE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY AS AN
INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
As mass communication has spread throughout the country,
and prejudicial media coverage saturates communities at ever increasing rates, courts have struggled to strike a balance between
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury and the First
213
Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press. Legal scholars
have characterized this balance to be between the “impartial” juror
214
and the “empty mind.” However, to a defendant on trial in such
an environment, it is a matter of the presumption of innocence versus the presumption of guilt and the right to a just trial untainted
by outside influences.
The concept of presumed prejudice, and not merely actual
prejudice, is a useful weapon in the fight against “trial by newspaper.” Therefore, when a criminal defendant is charged in a highprofile case and requests a change of venue, three factors are critical in evaluating the issue. The first factor is the existence of
knowledge about the case in the community of jurors. This includes awareness of facts or rumors that would not be admissible or
are going to be contested by the defendant at trial. The second factor is the “opinion of guilt” that exists within the community. Fi-

212. Id.; accord Oxereok v. State, 611 P.2d 913, 919 (Alaska 1980).
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, VI.
214. See ABRAMSON, supra note 16, at 45–55.
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nally, the third factor is the strength of such opinion. That is,
whether prospective jurors in the community, in the words of Chief
Justice Marshall, have a “strong,” as contrasted with a “light,” bias
215
against a defendant.
Trial courts have traditionally relied on the voir dire process to
measure the extent of juror bias. However, empirical studies have
demonstrated that the voir dire process is not effective in uncovering significant biases and prejudices that jurors may bring to a
216
courtroom after exposure to pretrial publicity. A public opinion
survey, properly conducted, can directly address the critical factors
of the impact of pretrial publicity prior to the voir dire process.
Such a survey must employ the highest level of scientificallyaccepted standards for the market research industry, including
skilled practitioners in survey design, “best practices” techniques
for unbiased inquiries, and ethical considerations throughout the
research process. For this reason, though not frequently used, public opinion polling has been recognized as an important tool in assessing the need for a change of venue in high-profile cases since at
217
least the 1970s. Fairly recently, these surveys have proven to be a
critical tool in evaluating motions for change of venue in high218
profile cases in federal district court in Alaska.
219

A. United States v. Cheely (Cheely II)
In 1992, the Federal Defender for the District of Alaska was
appointed to represent Raymond Cheely in a high-profile federal
220
murder prosecution. Cheely, Doug Gustafson, Craig Gustafson,
and Peggy Gustafson-Barnett were charged with conspiracy to mail
a package bomb that caused the death of one and seriously injured
221
another.

215. Burr I, 25 F.Cas. at 51.
216. See Broeder, supra note 115, at 505–21; Suggs & Sales, supra note 115, at
271; Ziesel & Diamond, supra note 115, at 528–29.
217. Stephen J. Arnold & Alan D. Gold, The Use of Public Opinion Poll on a
Change of Venue Application, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 445 (1979); Nietzel & Dillehay, supra
note 46, at 309; Arthur J. Pollock, The Use of Public Opinion Polls to Obtain
Changes of Venue and Continuances in Criminal Trials, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 269
(1977); Neil Vidmar & John W. Judson, The Use of Social Science Data in a
Change of Venue Application: A Case Study, 59 CAN. B. REV. 76, 79–92, 100
(1981).
218. E.g., United States v. Cheely, A92-073 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 1992); United
States v. Maas, A01-0174 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 2001).
219. A92-073 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 1992).
220. United States v. Cheely, 790 F. Supp. 901, 902–06 (D. Alaska 1992).
221. United States v. Cheely, 814 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (D. Alaska 1992).
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Cheely and Doug Gustafson first entered the public eye in
1990, when they were charged and convicted of a highway shoot222
ing. George Kerr was the third passenger in the car with Cheely
223
and Doug Gustafson, and testified against the two at trial. The
state murder trial against Cheely and Doug Gustafson had received
224
Both were convicted, and Cheely rea great deal of publicity.
225
ceived a sixty-year prison sentence.
That publicity increased with the federal indictment of Cheely
and Doug Gustafson for masterminding the mailing of a bomb to
226
Kerr’s home. The package was opened by Kerr’s parents, killing
227
his father and seriously injuring his mother. Media coverage following the mail-bomb investigation was intense. The defense attempted to demonstrate that prejudice was induced by that publicity. The Federal Defender Office hired Craciun & Associates to
conduct a public opinion survey to assess the bias and prejudice in
228
the pool of prospective jurors.
229
Craciun & Associates (“CRG”), an applied marketing research firm based in Anchorage, had conducted more than one
hundred public opinion surveys nationally and many in the Anchorage area, primarily for businesses, governmental agencies, and
230
political campaigns. CRG’s research design included a quantitive
methodology whereby professionally trained interviewers conducted telephone surveys of a representative sample of the target
231
audience.
CRG randomly selected the survey sample from a list of registered voters residing in the Anchorage Division of the Federal Dis232
trict Court. Anchorage, the Mat-Su Valley, the Kenai Peninsula,
the Aleutians and Western Alaska, Kodiak, Cordova, and Valdez,

222. Cheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993); see also discussion
supra pt. I.
223. Cheely, 861 P.2d. at 1172–73.
224. Id. at 1170–73.
225. Id. at 1169.
226. United States v. Cheely, A92-073 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 1992).
227. United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
228. CRACIUN & ASSOCIATES, PUBLIC OPINION STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE: IS RAYMOND CHEELY GUILTY OR NOT?
(1992) [hereinafter CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL].
229. This firm is now known as Craciun Research Group, Inc.
230. Craciun Research Group, Inc., http://www.craciun.com/ (last visited Sept.
27, 2005). Although Jean Craciun, a sociologist, had conducted surveys similar to
this one, CRG had not. See id.
231. CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL, supra note 228, at 3.
232. Id. at 4.
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Alaska were all located within the sample area.233 The sample also
reflected the proportion of registered voters in the State House dis234
tricts that constitute the Anchorage Division. According to the
sample size of 608, if researchers had interviewed every registered
voter meeting juror requirements in the Anchorage District, the
findings would differ from these survey results by no more than 4.1
235
percentage points in either direction. Thus, the margin of error
236
was +/- 4.1%.
CRG meticulously designed questions to assess respondents’
237
awareness and perceptions of the case details. Their survey instrument identified topics for inquiry, such as media habits, knowledge about case elements, feelings about the defendants’ guilt or
innocence, knowledge of the defendants’ earlier crimes, and demo238
graphic information. The CRG interviewers sought to keep nonresponse to a minimum, accurately record responses to all questions, answer frequently-asked questions, and use vocabulary rele239
vant to the study. The final report included summaries and rele240
vant frequency tables of the various responses.
The survey results indicated that pretrial publicity concerning
241
In response,
Cheely had significantly influenced the jury pool.
Cheely and Doug Gustafson filed a motion for a change of venue
242
in the District Court of Alaska. To support their motion, they at243
tached the survey results and presented an analysis of the newspaper articles appearing in the Anchorage Daily News relating to
Cheely or Gustafson for a period of twenty-two months prior to the
244
federal mail-bomb conspiracy indictment.
After a review of the news articles and the public opinion survey results, United States District Court Judge James M. Fitzgerald
concluded that the defendants had met the burden of establishing

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 5.
236. Id. Note that for subgroups the sampling error is larger.
237. Id. at 3.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 4.
240. Id. at 6.
241. Id.
242. United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska Nov. 13, 1992)
(order granting transfer of venue).
243. Id. at 34–35.
244. Id. at 9.
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“presumed prejudice” and ordered a transfer of venue under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a).245
Judge Fitzgerald’s decision summarized the primary factors to
be examined in evaluating a claim of presumed prejudice due to
246
pretrial publicity, including the nature, frequency, and timing of
247
coverage by the media. The court noted that in analyzing the nature of pretrial publicity, the court should distinguish between “factual reporting of the charges and reporting that proclaims the de248
Other
fendant’s guilt or focuses on inadmissible evidence.”
variables identified that may influence a determination of presumed prejudice include the jury pool’s size and sophistication, the
249
nature of the crimes, and the victims’ anonymity. The final factor
was polling data that “may show the extent to which pretrial pub250
licity had a prejudicial effect on the jury pool community.”
The court reviewed sixty-four newspaper articles concerning
Cheely and Gustafson published in the Anchorage Daily News in
251
the period between October 19, 1990 and August 14, 1992. The
court noted that publicity concerning the defendants had substantially continued from the time of the bombing through the time
that the change of venue motion was filed, but more important
252
than the frequency of the articles was their nature and substance.
The court stated that intense media coverage was “partially due to
the understandable public interest in a fatal mail bombing allegedly
253
directed from jail towards a witness in a criminal trial.” The articles consistently reported “what is said to be the facts of the case,
the identities of the defendants, along with the details of their participation in the mail bombing and the other charges set out in the
254
indictment.”
As to the prejudicial nature of the coverage, the court found
that the news media reported a number of crimes that were attributed to the defendants prior to the charges in the indictment, in-

245. Id. at 39.
246. Id. at 5.
247. Id. (citing United States v. Engleman, 489 F. Supp. 48, 51 (E.D. Mo.
1980)).
248. Id. (citing United States v. Dischner, Nos. 89-30333-4, slip op. at 11415
(9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1992)).
249. Id. (citing Hart v. Stagner, 935 F.2d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991)).
250. Id. at 6 (citing United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir.
1982)).
251. See id. at 9.
252. Id. at 27.
253. Id. at 28.
254. Id. at 28–29.
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formation that would probably not be admissible at trial.255 Additionally, much of the publicity tended to establish the defendants’
guilt by linking them to well-known confessions of alleged co256
conspirators and statements attributed to the defendants.
However, it was the survey that confirmed the prejudicial im257
Polling data demonstrated detailed and
pact of the publicity.
258
prejudicial knowledge of the case. Sixty-seven percent of the respondents were able to give details of the victims, and seventy-four
259
percent identified revenge as the motive of the crime. Thirty-five
percent volunteered the names of one or both defendants, un260
prompted. Twenty-one percent recalled that the defendants had
committed previous crimes other than the highway shooting, in261
cluding rape, burglary, assault, and a prior bombing. The most
critical survey result was that seventy percent of these prospective
jurors polled felt that the defendants were either guilty or probably
262
guilty. Judge Fitzgerald concluded:
The Craciun survey shows that the public in the present case has
more than a general awareness of the defendants’ crimes. Large
portions of the public know specific and prejudicial types of information, such as the identity of the victims, the motive, and
prior crimes that may not be admissible at trial. The survey
shows that the public knowledge of the defendants bears directly
on their guilt or innocence. I find that the survey conducted by
Craciun & Associates supports the finding and conclusion
reached that there is a substantial prejudice against the defen263
dants within the prospective juror pool.

Interlocutory appeals delayed the Cheely trial for another two
264
In February 1993, Joseph Ryan was indicted as a coyears.
conspirator in the mail bombing for allegedly providing the explo-

255. Id. at 29.
256. Id. at 29–30.
257. See CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL, supra note 228, at i (indicating that 67%
of respondents gave details of the case as it was reported in the media and that
“[t]he more knowledgeable respondents were of the crime, the more often they
handed a guilty verdict to both defendants”).
258. See id.
259. Id. at 12–13.
260. Id. at 14.
261. See United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 32, 36, 42 (D.
Alaska Nov. 13, 1992) (order granting transfer of venue).
262. CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL, supra note 228, at 25.
263. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 38 (order granting transfer of venue).
264. See, e.g., United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
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sives used in the bomb.265 When the case was remanded for trial,
the government moved for a ruling vacating the order granting
change of venue, and even submitted its own public opinion survey
266
by the Dittman Research Corporation. Cheely commissioned a
267
second survey by CRG.
The case was assigned to the Honorable James M. Burns, Senior District Court Judge of Oregon, who refused to vacate Judge
Fitzgerald’s order granting change of venue: “Based on the results
of the three public opinion polls and the testimony of Mr. Dittman
and Ms. Craciun, I am satisfied that the same circumstances which
led Judge Fitzgerald to find presumed prejudice in November 1992
268
continue to prevail.” Judge Burns found that the polling data established that the prejudice had not dissipated over the two-year
period:
I am satisfied that neither the reduction in coverage nor the purported qualitative changes in the nature of the media coverage
of this case have resulted in significant loss of memory or change
of opinion among the population of prospective jurors.
This conclusion is supported and reflected in the public opinion
surveys. The second Craciun survey and the Dittman survey
show very high community awareness of the details of the mail
bombing event and the allegations against defendants,269including
the identity of the defendants and their alleged motive.

The trial of Cheely and Ryan was moved to Tacoma, Washing270
ton. Cheely was convicted and Ryan was acquitted of all charges,
except for one count of possession of an unregistered explosive de271
A trial before a jury tainted by pretrial publicity was
vice.
avoided. The same could not be said of the trial of Nezar “Mike”
Khaled Maad in Anchorage in February 2002.

265. United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 1 (D. Alaska Dec. 14,
1994) (order denying motion to vacate Judge Fitzgerald’s order changing venue).
266. Id. at 2.
267. See CRACIUN & ASSOCIATES, 1993 CHANGE OF VENUE STUDY
CONDUCTED FOR THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE: IS RAYMOND
CHEELY GUILTY OR NOT? (1993) [hereinafter CRACIUN 1993 CHEELY POLL].
268. United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 4 (D. Alaska Dec. 14,
1994) (order denying motion to vacate Judge Fitzgerald’s order changing venue).
269. Id. at 5.
270. Id. at 6.
271. See United States v. Cheely, No. 95-30248, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11882
(9th Cir. May 19, 1997).

110805 04_CURTNERKASSIER.DOC

2005]

PRETRIAL PUBLICITY

1/3/2006 4:51 PM

285

B. United States v. Maad272
The Maad case presents a different challenge regarding adverse pretrial publicity. The Cheely case involved publicity related
directly to the issue of guilt, much of which would not have been
273
admissible at trial. In the case of Nezar “Mike” Khaled Maad,
publicity concerning sensational allegations of uncharged, reprehensible conduct in the immediate aftermath of September 11th
created extreme prejudice in the community for a completely unre274
lated fraud trial.
275
He immiMaad was born and raised in Damascus, Syria.
grated to the United States in 1976, at the age of eighteen, with the
276
dream of becoming an airplane pilot. Years later, his decision to
enter flight school in the United States would turn out to be unfortunately significant. Maad married, started a family, and was unable to finish flight school. He moved to Alaska in 1981, became a
naturalized United States citizen, and started his own printing
business in Anchorage.
Within hours after the terrorist attacks on the United States
on September 11, 2001, the Editorial Director of the Anchorage
277
Daily News contacted Bridge Builders Incorporated, a neighborhood strengthening organization that promotes tolerance and understanding between the diverse ethnic communities of Anchorage.
The Anchorage Daily News was trying to locate an Arab-American
Anchorage resident who might be willing to write an appeal for
tolerance in the community in the wake of the terrorist attacks.
The executive director of Bridge Builders contacted Maad, who
was then the Vice President of the organization and had earned a
reputation as a small businessman with many community contacts.
After consulting with his family and employees, Maad agreed to
write a letter to the community for publication in the editorial page
of the Anchorage Daily News. Maad’s letter appeared in the paper
on September 13, 2001, and was entitled Don’t Blame All Arabs for
278
Actions of a Few. Maad wrote: “On behalf of my family and local
272. No. A01-0174 CR (JKS) (D. Alaska 2001).
273. United States v. Cheely, No. A92-073 CR (JKS), at 29 (D. Alaska Nov. 13,
1992) (order granting transfer of venue).
274. See United States v. Maad, 75 F. App’x 599 (9th Cir. 2003).
275. Zaz Hollander, Vandals Trash Print Shop, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 23, 2001, at A1.
276. The majority of the following statements are based on the author’s interactions with Mr. Maad in the author’s capacity as Mr. Maad’s attorney.
277. Bridge Builders of Anchorage, http://www.bridgebuilders.ak.org (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
278. Editorial, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 13, 2001, at B6.
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members of the Arab-American community, I express our overwhelming sadness and disbelief that such a horrible act of violence
could be committed here in the United States, or for that matter,
279
anywhere in the world.”
Soon after the Anchorage Daily News ran Maad’s letter, the
Maad family began receiving harassing and threatening phone
280
calls. Nine days after the publication, the Maads’ printing busi281
ness was vandalized during the night. The print shop was broken
into, hundreds of thousands of dollars of equipment was destroyed,
282
Anchorage
and anti-Arab remarks were scrawled on the walls.
police quickly concluded that the vandalism was a hate crime and
283
called in the FBI to assist in the investigation. Over the next sev284
eral months, the FBI was unable to identify any suspects.
During that time, the Anchorage community responded to
help the Maads and to decry the vandalism and anti-Arab back285
lash. Bridge Builders oversaw a “Not in Our Town” campaign to
286
raise funds to support the Maads and the print shop employees.
A $10,000 reward was offered for information concerning the uni287
Within ten weeks, the “Not in Our Town”
dentified vandals.
288
campaign had raised a total of $57,715.
Within the highly emotional environment following September 11th, the print shop vandalism and the community’s reaction
received a great deal of local media attention. That attention escalated when the FBI investigation, unsuccessful in finding the vandals, turned the focus of the investigation to Mike Maad. On December 11, 2001, Maad was arrested by the FBI on a bank fraud
indictment concerning a Small Business Administration loan on
289
During the bail hearing, and
behalf of the printing business.
without relation to the bank fraud charge, the government an-

279. Id.
280. See Hollander, supra note 275, at A1.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See United States v. Maad, 75 F. App’x. 599, 600 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting
that the investigation was dropped on December 11, 2001).
285. Id.
286. Lisa Demer & Lucas Wall, Donors Open Wallets for Print Shop,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2001, at A1.
287. Id.
288. Lisa Demer, Not in Our Town Fund Frozen, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Dec. 12, 2001, at A1.
289. Lucas Wall, Feds Charge Owner of Print Shop, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Dec. 12, 2001, at A1.
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nounced to the media that Maad and his wife were suspects in the
destruction of his print shop.290
The public reaction was predictable. The public view of Maad
immediately changed from that of a courageous spokesperson for
tolerance to a traitorous scoundrel willing to use the terrorist tragedy for personal gain. Defense counsel for Maad in the bank fraud
prosecution faced a daunting challenge: How could the defense address the heated public reaction to the allegation that Maad vandalized his own shop and accepted public donations for his loss in a
completely unrelated trial? Once again, the Federal Defender Of291
fice commissioned a public opinion survey by CRG.
A telephone survey was conducted from late December 2001
292
The survey reflected that Maad had
to early January 2002.
293
quickly become a public figure in the Anchorage community.
Seventy-six percent of those polled were aware that Maad had
294
been arrested. When questioned about their opinion as to guilt
or innocence, fifty-five percent were willing to say Maad was
“guilty or probably guilty” of bank fraud, while thirty-five percent
went so far as to say that he was “guilty or probably guilty” of the
295
This time, when the prejudicial media reports and
vandalism.
public opinion survey were presented to the District Court, the
296
court refused to change venue. The court rejected the argument
that prejudice could be presumed and relied on jury voir dire to
297
measure the prejudicial impact of the publicity on the jury venire.
The pretrial proceedings of Maad’s fraud trial began in January, 2002, a little more than four months after the vandalism at the
298
print shop. Although a carefully conducted voir dire by the trial
judge revealed little evidence of actual prejudice, the polling data
299
reflected a contrary public sentiment. Maad was convicted, and

290. Maad, 75 F. App’x. at 600.
291. CRACIUN RESEARCH GROUP, INC., FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER DISTRICT
OF ALASKA: CHANGE OF VENUE STUDY (2002) [hereinafter CRACIUN 2002 MAAD
POLL].
292. Id. at 5.
293. Id. at 3 (indicating that 58% of respondents identified Maad or the shop
owner as being involved in the vandalism incident).
294. Id. at 3.
295. Id. at 4.
296. United States v. Maad, A01-0174 CR, 5 (JKS), at 5 (D. Alaska Jan. 16,
2002) (report and recommendation denying change of venue).
297. Id. at 2–4.
298. Id. at 5.
299. See CRACIUN 2002 MAAD POLL, supra note 291, at 3–4.
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he appealed his conviction exclusively on the theory of presumed
prejudice.300
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
agreed with Maad that a change of venue should have been
301
granted. A panel of judges found that the nature and frequency
of the media coverage concerning Maad was highly prejudicial:
The Maads were subject to a cascade of publicity. From the date
their store was vandalized through the period preceding the trial,
the four Anchorage television stations broadcast 124 news accounts that related to vandalism of Maad’s print shop, the Anchorage community’s initial sympathy and support for Maad and
his wife, the governments [sic] criminal charges of bank fraud
against Maad, the government’s termination of the hate crime
investigation, and the government’s statement at Maad’s bail
hearing that the Maads were suspects of the vandalism at the
print shop. And the only daily newspaper in Anchorage, The
Anchorage Daily News, ran regular front-page stories on the
print shop vandalism, the outpouring of community support, the
government’s charges and accusations against Maad, and the
community’s negative reaction toward302Maad after he was named
a suspect in the vandalism to his store.

The Ninth Circuit held that prejudice would be presumed, in spite
of the record of jury selection that uncovered little evidence of bias
by the individual jurors questioned:
At issue here is a claim of presumptive prejudice rather than actual prejudice. . . . Given the confluence of the extraordinary
events described above, the district court abused its discretion
and we reverse the district court’s denial of Maad’s motion for a
change of venue to a federal court outside of Anchorage. Those
events, viewed in their entirety, precluded Maad from obtaining
303
a fair trial in Anchorage.

C. Why Public Opinion Surveys Work
Why was there such a drastic discrepancy in the results of the
304
public opinion survey and the voir dire in the Maad case? Moreover, which was the more accurate gauge of the impact of pretrial
publicity on the jury? There are clearly two schools of thought on
which method is the better measure of prejudice. One perspective
was articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

United States v. Maad, 75 F. App’x. 599, 601 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 600–01.
Id. at 601.
See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text.

110805 04_CURTNERKASSIER.DOC

2005]

1/3/2006 4:51 PM

PRETRIAL PUBLICITY

289

It is our judgment that in determining whether a fair and impartial jury could be empanelled [sic] the trial court did not err in
relying less heavily on a poll taken in private by private pollsters
and paid for by one side than on a recorded, comprehensive voir
dire examination conducted by the judge in the presence of all
parties and their counsel pursuant to procedures, practices and
principles305developed by the common law since the reign of
Henry II.

That approach sacrifices the concept of “presumed” prejudice and
puts all of the eggs of fairness and due process in the “actual”
306
prejudice basket.
We, on the other hand, would argue that the emphasis should
be placed on a scientifically valid public opinion survey that can detect bias outside of the pressurized atmosphere of a courtroom. It
is exactly because public opinion surveys are “conducted in an atmosphere free from the pressure and regimentation of the jury se307
lection process” that “[t]he results of properly conceptualized and
administered surveys provide courts with the best and most interpretable data concerning how the community has internalized and
308
responded to information about the crime and the defendant.”
People are much more inclined to be honest when questioned by
unintimidating, unnamed, and relatively unintrusive, neutral researchers, in the comfort of their home, and where there is no
“wrong” answer that will lead to “dismissal.” In a professionally
conducted survey, the fact that the research is administered or financed by one party should not influence responses.
D. The Cost: Wishful Thinking?
We recognize that the expense of a scientifically designed and
professionally administered public opinion survey can be prohibitive and beyond the reach of many criminal defendants, public defender agencies, and court-appointed counsel. However, in those
few exceptional cases that draw the glare of relentless media coverage, the cost of such research may well be justified. A public
opinion survey could be less expensive than lengthy and intensive
jury voir dire procedures, and certainly would be less expensive
than the costs of an appellate reversal and retrial.
The other question Alaska courts should consider is: What is
the price of justice? If a public opinion survey is the best way to

305. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 64 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
306. See id.
307. O’Connell, supra note 32, at 183.
308. Thomas Beisecker, The Role of Change of Venue in an Electronic Age, 4
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 86 (1995).
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analyze the impact of pretrial publicity on the jury venire, as independent studies have shown, should the court system automatically
reject the information a survey could provide in those few cases in
which pretrial publicity is of substantial concern? The jurisprudential value of a jury verdict that the public can believe was based on
evidence presented in a courtroom to a neutral and unbiased jury
far outweighs the cost of a scientifically based, unbiased market research study.
Nevertheless, there potentially exists a less expensive alternative. A professional public opinion survey is carefully designed to
elicit honest responses from a representative sample of the jury
pool. The same methodology could possibly be used to create a
questionnaire designed for the specific venire summoned for a trial.
The questionnaire could accompany the mailed summonses and
would be completed prior to arrival at the courthouse. The written
responses would be evaluated by skilled researchers in the same
way as those gathered from the general public. Such an alternative
would not only properly place the focus on “presumed,” rather
than “actual” prejudice, it would also be less expensive than a full
public opinion research project, since it would only be aimed at the
actual jury panel.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that three lessons can be gleaned by
Alaska courts from the Cheely and Maad cases. The first is that in
order to protect the defendant’s right to an impartial jury, the
change-of-venue analysis must be a two-step process that independently analyzes both types of prejudice. This approach acknowledges two realities of our modern world and the criminal justice system. First, information that is questionable or inadmissible
at trial but widely disseminated in the community can infect the
309
minds of jurors and subvert the principle of an impartial jury.
Second, demonstrating the true impact of pretrial publicity on prospective jurors in a courtroom setting is a difficult and perhaps insurmountable task for defendants.
The second lesson of Cheely and Maad arises from the surveys
conducted in those cases. A scientifically conducted public opinion
survey is a vital instrument for gauging the impact of prejudicial
310
As was made blatantly evident in the Maad
pretrial publicity.
case, the true effects of extrajudicial media sources on the prospective jurors can be better measured by scientifically based research
309. See id.
310. See, e.g., CRACIUN 2002 MAAD POLL, supra note 291, at 3–4.
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than by the artificial and restrictive process of voir dire.311 A valid
public opinion survey of the prospective jury pool can measure the
community’s knowledge of facts and rumors that would be contested by the defense at trial or would not be admissible as evidence, assess the prevalent opinion in the community as to the guilt
312
of the defendant, and calculate the strength of that opinion. With
this information, the trial court can determine with confidence
313
whether prejudice of the prospective jurors should be presumed.
The juxtaposition of the two Cheely prosecutions, state and
federal, also demonstrates the value of a public opinion survey. In
Cheely v. State, the court of appeals concluded that “[o]ne fact that
emerged from this individual questioning was that, in a large community such as Anchorage, many residents do not follow media
314
The public opinion surveys conducted in
coverage of events.”
315
A majority of people polled
Cheely proved quite the contrary.
for the federal trial could recall details from the media publicity:
67% could recount information about the victims, and 74% identi316
fied revenge as the motive. Moreover, 31% volunteered the defendants’ names, unprompted; 21% knew about the defendants’
prior crimes; and 71% believed that Cheely was guilty, or probably
317
guilty, before he entered a courtroom.
Furthermore, while the Alaska courts have consistently declared that a delay of months between pretrial publicity and trial
“blunts” the impact of that publicity, the second public opinion
survey in the Cheely II case, conducted over a year later, showed
that the prejudicial impact on the Anchorage community survived
318
several years after the alleged crime. The focus of the presumed
prejudice analysis should be on the nature and extent of the media
coverage and its actual prevalence in the minds of prospective jurors, in addition to the immutability of their subsequent conclusions about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. It is unrealistic to
assume that a delay of a few months between publicity and trial
will automatically mitigate the impact of prejudicial media cover319
age.
311. See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., CRACIUN 2002 MAAD POLL, supra note 291, at 3–4.
313. See, e.g., Maad, 75 F. App’x. at 601.
314. 861 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
315. See CRACIUN 1992 CHEELY POLL, supra note 228, at 12–13.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 14, 32, 42, 25.
318. CRACIUN 1993 CHEELY POLL, supra note 267, at i (“As in 1992, the combined answers, guilty or probably guilty, add to 71%”).
319. See id.
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The third lesson of these cases is that expressed by Justice
Thomas Clark almost forty years ago: “[W]e must remember that
reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial meas320
ures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception.” Accurately
ascertaining the bias in a community, and moving venue in the few
cases that require it, is not only economical but also minimizes the
damage of appellate reversals to all facets of justice.
Alaska courts can revitalize the rights to a fair and impartial
jury trial, as guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution, by reevaluat321
ing the application of the Mallott standard of presumed prejudice.
The focus should be on the honest recognition of the tremendous
impact the media can have, even on large communities, in a state
with such a small population. Moreover, the best way to measure
that impact accurately is through a valid public opinion survey.
The same type of scientifically based market research information
that explores, assists, and explains commercial, governmental and
political decision-making at all levels of our community should certainly be an acceptable tool in the decision-making process of a
trial judge. And, if use of this “gold standard” in evaluating the
impact of pretrial publicity for purposes of presumed prejudice
analysis is not practical, a possible alternative is to employ the
same methodology used in scientifically based surveys to elicit honest, uninfluenced, and uninhibited responses to a pre-trial juror
questionnaire. This questionnaire should be provided to prospective jurors in the privacy of their homes prior to their appearance
for jury duty, and the results should be analyzed for the parties and
the court by experienced researchers.
If, however, Alaska courts still rely on the jury selection process to measure the impact of pretrial publicity on jurors, they must,
at a minimum, be cognizant of the presumed prejudice and actual
prejudice dichotomy and that this bifurcation of prejudice review
provides separate, and equally vital, safeguards of the right to an
impartial jury. Furthermore, in those few cases where jury bias is a
concern, the trial courts should at least be receptive to extensive incourt written questionnaires and individual voir dire, perhaps even
in chambers where jurors can feel more comfortable revealing personal views that have been irreparably influenced by unsanctioned
sources. The alternative is that criminal defendants who have been
“tried” in the press will walk into a courtroom with a presumption
of guilt rather than innocence.
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